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THE BUCK STOPS HERE: ILLINOIS
CRIMINALIZES SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
VICTORIA MEYEROV*
If you are a poor man, I cannot know what you will do with the donation I give you. But I don't know if a poor man would buy bullets.'
INTRODUCTION
Antixania, a nation once known as a powerful and sovereign
state, no longer exists.2 Displaced by war with Xania, a neighboring country, Antixanians are scattered throughout the world. Still,
some have chosen to remain on their native soil and follow what
they believe is their God's will: survive and kill your way to freedom. These Antixanians are carrying on their mandate against
Xanians at home and abroad. They bomb ships, planes, trains and
buildings. They are international terrorists.
For other Antixanians, the United States has become their
new home. Here, they have pieced together their families, their
religion and their lives. Many of these Antixanian-Americans remain sympathetic to the struggle that continues in Antixania.
They do what they can to help, even though U.S. citizens continue
to be among the innocent victims killed by Antixanian terrorists.
The Antixanian-American community in part funds many of these
violent attacks.
Ms. X is one such supporter. Every weekend she goes to a religious fellowship, where she and her family worship the Antixanian God. At the end of each service, the fellowship leader, Mr.
Y, describes the attacks planned by Antixanian terrorists. Mr. Y

* J.D. Candidate, 1998.
1. Stephen Franklin, U.S. Probing Chicago Connection to Hamas, CHI.

TRIB., Nov. 16, 1994, § 1, at 20. The statement was made by Rafeeq Jaber, a
spokesman for the Bridgeview Mosque, Illinois. Id. Mr. Jabar, a financial
planner in the Chicago suburbs, is a contributor to the Holy Land Foundation,
one of five Muslim-oriented charities in the United States. Id. Beginning in
the early 1990s, this Islamic charity was accused of funding numerous terrorist attacks organized by Hamas. Id. Hamas is a Muslim extremist movement
engaged in "Jihad," or the "Holy War" against Israel. Id.
2. While Antixania is a fictitious country, this hypothetical illustrates the
origin of a terrorist organization.
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then asks for contributions and Ms. X writes a check for fifty dollars.3 She prays that some day her native land will once again be a
free and sovereign nation under the Antixanian flag.
In July 1996, Illinois became the pioneer state in combating
international terrorism." The new addition to the Illinois Criminal
Code makes it a Class One felony' to solicit or contribute "material
support"6 with the intent to fund an act of international terrorism.7
Inevitably, as is the case with many new laws, the constitutionality of this recent addition to the Illinois Criminal Code may well be
challenged. This Comment argues that the newly enacted Article
5/29C of the Illinois Criminal Code is constitutionally valid because it does not violate the First Amendment or the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, or the Supremacy Clause.
Part I describes the history of international and domestic terrorism and its effect on the American people. Part I also outlines the
activities of international terrorists in Illinois. Part II reviews federal measures aimed at combating terrorism. Part III analyzes
legislative efforts by the states in enacting antiterrorism laws.
Part IV discusses First and Fourth Amendment freedoms and
demonstrates why the new Illinois Law does not violate any of the
constitutional guarantees and is a valid exercise of state police
power. Part IV concludes with the examination of the Supremacy
Clause and the potential preemption concerns.
I.

TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

This Part discusses the history of international and domestic
terrorism and its devastating consequences. This Part also outlines the effect of terrorism on the lives of the American people
and concludes with the description of the activities of international
3. This exchange illustrates a situation that the newly enacted Illinois
antiterrorism law prohibits. See 720 ILCS 5/29C-10 (1996) (prohibiting the
solicitation of funds with intent to aid an international terrorist organization).
See also 720 ILCS 5/29C-15 (1996) (prohibiting the contribution of funds with
the intent to aid an international terrorist organization). See infra notes 99120 and accompanying test for a further discussion of the Illinois law.
4. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Weill, co-author of the Illinois antiterrorism law (Sept. 13, 1996). Two other states, Wisconsin and Maryland,
unsuccessfully attempted to enact similar legislation but the acts failed constitutional scrutiny. See infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative attempts in Wisconsin and Maryland.
5. A Class One felony is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment
for a period of no less than four years and not more than 15 years. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(4) (1994).
6. Material support is defined as "currency or other financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets." 720 ILCS
5/29C-5 (1996).
7. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5, 10, 15.
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terrorists in Illinois which gave rise to the enactment of the state's
antiterrorism law.
A. Recent Threats of Terrorism on American Soil
While terrorism has been a part of the human experience for
close to a millennium, no uniform definition of terrorism exists.8
The common consensus, however, is apparent: the objective of terrorism is to instill fear and intimidation.9 More significantly, terrorists have succeeded in their endeavors.'1 Americans are fright-

8. See, e.g., Beverly Allen, InternationalTerrorism:Prevention and Remedies: Talking "Terrorism":Ideologies and Paradigmsin a Postmodern World,
22 SYRACUSE J. INTL L. & COM. 7, 8 (1996) (asserting that the definition of
terrorism changes according to the user's ideological beliefs); HENRY H. HAN,
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL
CONTROL 163 (1993). Other authors referred to terrorism as a "form of ulti-

mate protest," noting that terrorists use violence to instill fear for political
purposes.

E. NOBLES LOWE & HARRY D. SHARGEL, LEGAL

AND

OTHER

(1977). "Terrorism is a doctrine about the efficacy
of unexpected, dramatic, and life-threatening violence for inducing political
change, and a strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine." Ted
Robert Gurr, Empirical Research and State Terrorism, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 116 (Robert 0. Slater & Michael

ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 208

Stohl eds., 1988).

A federal statute defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Annual Country
Reports on Terrorism, 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (1994). The Illinois antiterrorism
law defines terrorism as "[a] violent act or acts, perpetrated by a private person or non-governmental entity, dangerous to human life ... and are (iii) intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of the government by assassination or kidnapping." 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (1996).
9. See Alex Schmid, Goals and Objectives of International Terrorism, in,
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 63 (Robert 0. Slater
& Michael Stohl eds., 1988). LOWE & SHARGEL, supra note 8, at 116. The
former head of Mossad, the Israeli secret intelligence service, stated that the
objective of terrorism is to permeate its victims with fear. Richard B. Strauss,
Nahum Admani; Going Public:FormerHead of Mossad Talks of TerrorismAnd How to Fight It, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at M3.
10. Remarks by Secretary of Defense William Perry to the American Bar
Association, FED. NEWS

SERV.,

Aug. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-

brary, Curnews File. "One of our darkest fears in this new era is the specter
of terrorism. Terrorism hangs like a dark cloud over our hopes." President
Bill Clinton described terrorism "the number One threat of the 21st century."
Bruce Wallace, The Fear Factor; Governments Grapple With A New, Anonymous Style Of Terror, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 12, 1996, at 26. Statistics also show
that fear is a prevalent emotional response by Americans to the threat of terrorism. Peter McGrath et al., Psychic Scars, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1996, at 36.
Dr. Orrin Bright of Grady Memorial Hospital Trauma Center in Atlanta,
Georgia, stated that depression was common following a bomb explosion at
the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta in July of 1996. Id. Andrew Young,
the former mayor of Atlanta described his emotional state after the bombing
as "almost complete numbness and despair." Id.
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ened, and for a good reason, as only natural disasters register a
higher death toll than acts of terrorism."
The past three years have proved to be especially traumatic
for America. In 1993, religious fanatics bombed the World Trade
Center in New York City and fatally wounded two CIA employees
in Virginia. 12 Two years later, members of a militia group bombed
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing
and wounding hundreds of children and adults." In July 1996
alone, nineteen American soldiers were killed in a bomb attack at
U.S. Army barracks in Saudi Arabia, all 230 passengers aboard the
Paris-bound TWA Flight 800 perished in a strongly suspected
bomb explosion off the coast of Long Island, New York, and a bomb
explosion killed one woman and injured 111 people in Atlanta's
Centennial Olympic Park."' Consequently, recognizing the need
for aggressive measures in the war against terrorism, the United
States government assumed its role as a leader in the world's efforts to combat terrorism.' 5 Since 1995, the White House has sponsored four antiterrorism bills, demonstrating its determination to

11. Brian Jenkins, Future Trends In InternationalTerrorism, in CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 255 (Robert 0. Slater & Michael Stohl eds., 1988).
12. Richard Robertson, Front, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 31, 1993, at Al.
Yossef Bodansky, former Director of the U. S. House's Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare asserted that both terrorist attacks were
planned at the 1991 meeting of the militant branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad in Phoenix, Arizona. Id. According to Mr. Bodansky,
neither this conference, nor the ones held in Chicago and Kansas City in 1989
and 1990 respectively, were kept under surveillance, as the measures in effect
then did not allow such investigation without more than a reasonable suspicion. Id.
13. Judy Gibbs, Explosion in Oklahoma Kills 19; Toll From Car Bomb Includes 17 Children;200 Are Injured, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 19, 1995, at Al.
14. John Omicinski, This Ugly Word Speaks Only Of Hate, THE
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Aug. 11, 1996, at 3F. The same Pakistani terrorist, Ramza Ahmed Yousef, who was to stand trial in late 1996 for masterminding the World Trade Center bombing, was convicted of planning another
dozen plane explosions over the Pacific in 1995. Joan Beck, U.S. Should Take
a Realistic Approach to Terrorism, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1996, § 1, at 21. His
conviction came only a few weeks after the fatal crash of the TWA Flight 800,
and signaled that terrorism is on the rise. Id. It also signaled that the federal
authorities were failing in their attempts to counter terrorism. See id.
15. President Bill Clinton, Remarks On American Security in a Changing
World at the George Washington University, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 5, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File. President Clinton expressed his determination to intensify antiterrorism efforts in the United
States. Id. The President outlined a plan of action which included the newly
proposed legislation and additional funding to the agencies involved in the
war against terrorist violence. Id. "[T]he United States must lead on this-no
other country will do it. We have the best reason: The terror is now unquestionably in our backyard." Id. President Clinton reassured that fighting terrorism is "both a national priority and a national security priority." Id.
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eradicate terrorist activity affecting Americans.

8

B. Activities of InternationalTerroristsin Illinois
While Illinois has not suffered from terrorist attacks as profoundly as Oklahoma City or New York, 7 international terrorists'
activities affect Illinois in a debilitating way."8 Almost immediately following the origination of Hamas, an Islamic terrorist organization, in 1987, Chicago has been at the heart of its fundraising activities in the United States.'8 Chicago's population includes
an estimated 300,000 Muslims, making it the nation's most established Muslim community. 20 In 1993, members of this community
became prime suspects after Israeli officials arrested and charged
two Muslim Chicagoans with transporting currency and intelligence orders from the United States to Hamas" In the course of
16. 141 CONG. REC. S7880 (daily ed. June 7, 1995); The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132 (1996); The Aviation
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996, H.R. 3953, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996); and The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110
Stat. 1541 (1996). See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text for the discussion of this legislation.
17. See supra notes 12, 13 and accompanying text for a discussion of terrorist attacks in New York City and Oklahoma City.
18. Franklin, supra note 1, at § 1, at 20. As the connection between Islamic
Hamas and Chicago Muslim community resurfaced, some Israeli officials demanded action. Id. Following a Hamas bus bombing in Israel in October
1994, the U.S. State Department acknowledged that Americans contribute
financially to Hamas' livelihood. Id.
19. Id. Hamas, which means "zeal" in Arabic and is also an acronym for
Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded in 1987 in the Gaza Strip. Id.
The organization, including its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, has as its goal the restoration of Palestine as an independent state.
Nicolas B. Tatro, Hamas Sells Death-Wish Videotapes, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12,
1994, § 1, at 23. In the period of 15 months, between the signing of the peace
accord between Israel and Palestinian Liberation Organization in September
of 1993 and December of 1994, Hamas' terrorists were responsible for 94
deaths. Id. Although Hamas, as it is known today, has been in existence since
1987, the tactics Hamas terrorist employ are similar to those of other Muslim
terrorists, namely, Shiites. See Strauss, supra note 9, at M3 (describing an
act of a typical suicide terrorism used in some religiously motivated terrorist
attacks).
20. Franklin, supra note 1, § 1, at 20. An estimated 70,000 are Palestinians, who emigrated from the West Bank. Id.
21. JUDITH MILLER, GOD HAS 99 NAMES (1996), reprintedin, CONFRONTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE ILLINOIS MODEL 16-19

(Jewish Community Relations Council ed., 1996). A Chicago-area used-car
dealer Muhammad Salah provided Israeli investigators with hard evidence of
Hamas activities and fundraising in the United States and Illinois in particular. 142 CONG. REC. E1081-04, E1082 (daily ed. June 13, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Schumer). Salah and his partner, Mohammed Jarad, were convicted,
and while Israeli officials released Salah upon serving six months in prison,
Jarad remains incarcerated. Todd Winer, In Question: Concerns About Terrorism Bill, THE NEWS, Apr. 14-20, 1995, at 30. While the U.S. government
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the investigation, Israeli officials discovered that prior to the arrest close to one million dollars had been deposited into a U.S.
bank account to provide for the needs of Hamas terrorists.2
However, government agencies investigating Hamas activities
in the United States had been ineffective in their attempts to connect the fundraising to any of the organization's known terrorist
attacks.13 Consequently, the U.S. government was unable to impose any sanctions on the individuals who contributed or solicited
funds in the United States, and particularly, in Illinois.2' The current law's inability to deal effectively with this situation mandates
additional legislation to deter fundraising organized by or on behalf of terrorist organizations.5 While most state governments did
did not begin an investigation into the Chicago-area Muslim community Hamas fundraising until 1993, Mr. Bodansky, then director of the U.S. House's
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare asserted that Islamic
terrorists held a meeting in Chicago as early as 1989. Robertson, supra note
12, at Al. Mr. Bodansky stated that even though the U.S. government was
informed of the Hamas activists' next gathering in Phoenix in 1993, the government did not authorize an investigation because of the lack of appropriate
sanctions. Id.
22. 142 CONG. REC. E1081-04, E1082 (daily ed. June 13, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Schumer). This banking transaction is not the only evidence of Muslim fundraising. Franklin, supra note 1, § 1, at 20. Numerous Muslim charities collect millions of dollars annually for what they say are humanitarian
causes. Id. However, the solicitors of funds do not welcome an inquiry into
the actual causes supported by the donations. Id. When questioned directly,
the response is unequivocal: "We support a militant struggle, if it is a just
cause." Id.
23. 142 CONG. REC. E1081-04, E1083 (daily ed. June 13, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Schumer). Vince Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism chief,
stated that although the investigation of funds channeling did not yield any
concrete findings, contributions to humanitarian causes usually benefit the
planning of the Hamas' terrorist attacks. Id.
24. Henry DePippo, International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies:
Criminal Remedies For TerroristActs, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 19, 23
(1996). Mr. DePippo is a former Senior Trial Counsel for the United States
Attorney's Office, who was in charge of the investigation and arrest of terrorists responsible for the New York World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Id. at
19. Mr. DePippo is distrustful of the federal government's ability to effectively prevent terrorism. Id. at 23. According to DePippo, "[one] cannot be
overly reliant on law enforcement to prevent terrorism. I just don't think that
the criminal justice system or law enforcement agencies have the tools that
they need to prevent terrorism." Id.
25. Charles Kruthamer, Anti-terrorism Measures Not Strong Enough, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 12, 1996, § 1, at 19. The United States government must be prepared to respond in kind to terrorist attacks and threats of violence. 141
CONG. REC., E1680-02 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lantos).
Prior to the enactment of the Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, the
first of four major legislative responses to terrorism, even the extradition procedures of a known terrorist Abu Marzuq were plagued with difficulties. Id.
To illustrate, while the United States government was arranging for Marzuq's
extradition to Israel, Hamas threatened President Clinton with adverse consequences. Id. Obviously, terrorists believe that the United States is not
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not feel the urgency to lead the way with antiterrorism proposals,
the federal government 6 and the Illinois legislature 7 were prepared to deal with the growing threat of terrorism.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXISTING LAWS
Since the end of the Cold War, terrorism has become the most
feared of all invisible enemies, replacing nuclear weapons. The
United States government responded to the threat by enacting a
series of laws designed to deter and punish terrorism. The international community has also become an arena for the most aggressive antiterrorism measures in the history of multi-national
cooperation. This Part addresses the federal and international
measures designed to combat terrorism. It begins with a review of
the United States' early legislative efforts aimed at combating terrorism and continues with an analysis of the contemporary legislative efforts of the United States government. This Part concludes with a discussion of recent antiterrorism measures enacted
through the joint efforts of the international community.

A. AntiterrorismEfforts in the Twentieth Century
Terrorism is a global issue.' Unlike the United States, which
did not experience the horrors of terrorism until the 1960s, other
nations have suffered for hundreds of years.' The statistics began
to change in the second half of the twentieth century."0 Virtually
untouched by terrorism until the last two decades, the United
States stood unprepared. Prior to the Nixon Administration, the
equipped with the proper means to respond to acts of hostility. Id.
26. See infra notes 45-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of recently enacted and pending federal laws combating terrorism.
27. See infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Illinois antiterrorism law, 720 ILCS 5/29C (1996).
28. USIA ForeignPress Center Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., June 25, 1996,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File.
29. ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN & DARRELL M. TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT,
at xiii (1977). See also LOWE & SHARPEL, supra note 8,

REALITY, RESPONSE,

at 210-13 (discussing the activities of terrorist organizations in Western
Europe, Japan and the Arab countries). In the 19th century, terrorism was a
means employed by radical nationalists and, later on, by anarchists, to express their ideological differences and overall discontent. Id. at 207.
30. LOWE & SHARPEL, supra note 8, at 218. "Of the 2,690 international
terrorist incidents that occurred between 1968 and 1978, more than 42 percent involved U.S. citizens and property." Id. According to 1975 CIA statistics, there were more incidents of terrorism in that year than at any time in
the past. KUPPERMAN & TRENT, supra note 29, at xiv. In the 1970s, a poll
assessing the attitude of Americans toward terrorism showed that almost
90% of Americans viewed terrorism as a serious global issue while 60% of
Americans viewed terrorism as a serious domestic problem. Id. at 3.
31. LOWE & SHARPEL, supra note 8, at 218. The United States had neither
the knowledge of security procedures, nor the legislative measures to deal
with the issue of terrorism. Id. To illustrate, when the first kidnappings of
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Espionage Act of 1917 had been the last enacted antiterrorism
measure." The antiquated provisions of the 1917 Act were insufficient to combat the horrors of terrorism that began plaguing the
nation with increasing fervor.' The United States was ready for
more aggressive measures." To supervise the U.S. antiterrorism
forces, President Nixon established a cabinet committee and organized the Office for Combating Terrorism." The Working Group
on Terrorism reported to the National Security Council's Special
Coordination Committee.'
However, the federal government
made only one legislative change to the United States Penal Code,
the Civil Rights Act of 1968. s7 This change resulted in the creation
of criminal penalties for domestic terrorism.8
In the 1980s, prompted by a series of attacks, including the
Libyan sponsored bombing of Pan American Flight 103, Congress
enacted a number of laws intended to combat terrorism originating
outside of the United States." However, as the continuance of terthe U. S. officials began to occur in the late 1960s, the United States assumed

the "superpower" stance, and the hostage was killed. Id. If the United States
had been more experienced and adopted the attitude of the majority of the
world towards dealing with hostage situations, it would have accepted the terrorists' demands in exchange for the safe return of the hostage. Id. at 214-15,
218.
32. See id. at 218. For more information about the Espionage Act of June
15, 1917, see Pub. L. No. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). See also Thomas C.
Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism PreventionAct of 1995, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 208-09 (1996).
33. LowE & SHARPEL, supra note 8, at 218.
34. KUPPERMAN & TRENT, supra note 29, at 3. The Harris Survey of 1970s
expressed the mood of the Americans, who felt the need for more stringent
antiterrorism measures. Id. For example, of those surveyed, 90% favored the
development of elite military units such as those used by the Israelis to combat terrorist activities. Id. Similarly, 80% favored terminating airline
flights to and from countries that give refuge to terrorists. Id. Over 50% of
those surveyed supported the death penalty for those convicted of terrorist
activity.. Id.
35. LOWE & SHARPEL, supra note 8, at 218.
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 557. The 1968 Civil Rights Act punished armed riots if they involved an intrastate element. Id. The 95th Congress was prepared to pass
only one legislative act intended to combat terrorism. Id. at 219. The 95th
Congress did however, pass two laws aimed at preventing international financial institutions from providing assistance to any state sponsors of terrorism. See Pub. L. No. 95-118, § 701.
38. LOWE & SHARPEL, supra note 8, at 557.

39. HAN, supra note 8, at 450. In 1984, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which created a section dealing with hostage situations. Id. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986
"established a new violation pertaining to terrorist acts conducted abroad
against U.S. Nationals." Id. President Reagan introduced a legislative package that would "send a strong and vigorous message to friend and foe alike
that the United States will not tolerate terrorist activity against its citizens
within its borders." President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. Papers, Admin. of
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rorist activities evidences, such efforts have been an insufficient
deterrent to ward off the surge of international terrorism in the
United States in the 1990s. '
B. Recently Enacted LegislationCombating Terrorism
A significant escalation of international terrorism characterized the early 1990s."' International terrorism scholars attributed
the rise of the number of incidents"2 to the upsurge of religious
fundamentalism around the world and in the United States.' The
international community took action via its major dispute resolution forum, the United Nations." The U.S. government also responded in kind by enacting three major pieces of legislation."
First, Congress passed the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.46 This Act contained unprecedented provisions for the expeditious removal of alien terrorists,'7 expanded the
scope of the Posse Comitatus Act," amended federal wiretapping
Ronald Reagan 575-76 (Apr. 26, 1984). The Hostage Taking Act was the result of the legislative efforts. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994).
40. HAN, supra note 8, at 445-46. The situation seemed to level off following law enforcement efforts after the bombings in 1983. Id. The mid and late
1980s counted no cases of international terrorism. Id. By the early 1990s,
however, terrorist activity was once again on the rise. Id. at 446, In 1992 and
1993 there were two major international terrorist activities in the United
States. First, in 1992, an Iranian opposition group overtook and briefly occupied the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York City. Id. Later,
in 1993, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in New York City. Id.
4L Id. at 462. In addition to the takeover of the Iranian Mission and the
bombing of the World Trade Center, in 1993, the FBI arrested and charged
eight people with attempt to build bombs intended for detonation in New York
City. Id.
42. Id. at 445. In 1989, there were four incidents; by 1993, the number of
incidents had grown to 12. Id.
43. Id. at 462. The U.S. Intelligence Community placed Iran, Syria, Libya

and Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Id.
44. Secretary-GeneralSays New Forms of International Cooperation Requires to Meet Global Issues, FED. NEWS SERV., May 31, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File.
45. The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th
Cong. (1995) [hereinafter CTPA]; The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter
AEDPA]; The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110
Stat. 1541 (1996) [hereinafter ILSA].
46. CTPA, S. 735., See generally Martin, supra note 32 (discussing the
CTPA).
47. The Alien Terrorist Removal Act, title III of S. 735. 141 CONG. REC.
87480 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
48. CTPA, S. 735, title IX, § 908. A Posse Comitatus is "[t]he power or
force of the county. The entire population of a county above the age of fifteen,
which a sheriff may summon to this assistance in certain cases, as to aid him
in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 806 (6th ed. 1991). This amendment allows the Attorney General to request military assistance to clean-up after the use of the chemical
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authority,49 mandated the use of taggants, 8 restricted publication
of bomb-making technology, 5' and reformed habeas corpus relief.52
Second, the Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").u The signing of this law
coincided with the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City
bombing." Congress intended the AEDPA to deter third-party financial contributions to terrorist organizations.8
Third, Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of
1996. Although the Act is aimed at punishing Iran and Libya,
which remain the most prolific supporters of state-sponsored terrorism, 57 the Act evoked an extremely controversial response.'
and biological weapons. CTPA, S. 735, title IX, § 908; Martin, supra note 32,
at 223-24.
49. CTPA, S. 735, title IX, § 909. Before Congress passed this amendment,
law enforcement officers had to show that the suspect changed telephone
numbers with intent to thwart government surveillance efforts. 141 CONG.
REC. S7756 (daily ed. June 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). Following the
passage of the amendment, however, the standard changed, allowing the government to show the effect of the change in telephone numbers. Id. See also
Martin, supra note 32, at 225-27 (discussing a proposal to amend S. 735 under
title IX).
50. CTPA, S. 735, title VII, § 708. This amendment required conducting a
study to determine whether the explosives could be marked with taggants for
tractability. 141 CONG. REC. S7660 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein). See also Martin, supra note 32, at 227-30 (discussing the provisions of S. 735 title VII, § 708).
51. CTPA, S. 735, title IX, § 901. This amendment prohibits the sharing of
bombmaking technology with someone who intends to make a bomb. 141
CONG. REC. S7682 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). See
also Martin, supra note 32, at 230-32 (discussing the taggants amendment
and its constitutionality).
52. CTPA, S. 735, title VI. The amendment shortens the deadline to file
the federal habeas petition, restricts the court's ability to hear additional petitions, and requires greater deference by federal courts to state court findings. S. 735, title V, §§ 601(d)(1), 606, 604. See also Martin, supra note 32, at
233-40 (discussing the constitutionality validity of habeas corpus reform).
53. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996). Similar to the Illinois antiterrorism legislation, the AEDPA's aim is to thwart terrorists' fundraising efforts.
CONFRONTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE IL-

LINOIS MODEL 39 (Jewish Community Relations Council ed., 1996). The
AEDPA differs from the Illinois law in that it targets specific international
terrorist groups and the subsequent freezing of their assets. Id.
54. See Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109
HARV. L. REV. 2074 (1996) for a complete discussion of the AEDPA.
55. AEDPA, § 102(e), § 2339B(a). "Whoever... knowingly provides material support or resources.., to any organization which the person knows is a
terrorist organization that has been designated under § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as a terrorist organization shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for more than ten years, or both." Id.
56. ILSA, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
57. See, e.g., Iran Denies US. Claims of Saudi Bomb Connection, REUTERS
N. Am. WIRE, Aug. 3, 1996, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File.
For example, Iran was a leading suspect in the deadly truck bombing of June
25, 1996, in Saudi Arabia. Id.; see also Inside Politics: Newt Gingrich Dis-
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The provisions of the Act impose severe sanctions on countries that
continue to trade and invest in Iran and Libya.' While the world
community concedes that available international antiterrorism
measures are seriously deficient,60 there is also global resentment
of America's "father-knows-best" attitude."'
Supporters of the Iran and Libya Sanction Act emphasized
that in the absence of the Act, there is neither a deterrence
mechanism in place, nor a remedial measures system to discourage the rest of the world from dealing with state sponsors of terrorism." However, even its supporters saw potential problems concerning the enforcement of the law.6 Some sympathetic critics
recognized that such a law cannot exist in a vacuum, and if other
nations choose to ignore the Act, the United States stands to suffer
a boomerang effect, potentially resulting in both political and ecocusses State-Sponsored Terrorism, (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 4, 1996)
(transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File) (citing evidence
that Hezbollah is linked to the bombing of American base in Saudi Arabia);
John Lancaster, Libyan Arms Factory A Myth, Mubarak Says, INVL HERALD
TRIB., May 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File
(discussing the United States allegations that Libya maintains an underground chemical weapon plants); Wall Finished at U.S. Embassy In Kuwait,
UPI, Aug. 5, 1996, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File (quoting
U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry as saying "[Iran remains] the leading
candidate for international terrorism directed against the United States.").
58. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H8125-01 (daily ed. July 23, 1996); Charles
Miller, Angry EU Threatens USA over Iran and Libya Trade Move, Press Association Newsfile, Aug. 5, 1995; Scott Steele & Luke Fisher, Shades of
Helms-Burton: Washington Targets Iran and Libya Over Terror, MACLEAN'S,
Aug. 19, 1996, at 32; Bruce W. Nelan et al., Taking On the World, TIME, Aug.
26, 1996, at 26.
59. Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996). The law sanctions any individual conducting business dealings with Iran "that would enhance the
ability of Iran to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources .... " 142 CONG. REC. H8125-01(daily ed. July 23, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Gilman). The law also penalizes business dealings of foreign persons who sell either weapons, aviation or oil supplies to Libya or Iran.
Id.
60. 142 CONG. REC. H8125-01(daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Roth). "There is no doubt that Iran and Libya are rouge states. The leaders of
these regimes continue to violate every standard of acceptable behavior. ... I
agree that current U.S. policy is failing badly, not achieving any of these
goals." Id. See also Nelan et al., supra note 58, at 26.
61. Nelan et al., supra note 58, at 26.
62. 142 CONG. REC. H8125-01 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hamilton). "[T]he conduct of Iran and Libya remains far outside international
norms, and our allies have simply not done enough to help us change that
conduct. Rhetoric alone is not sufficient, steps to increase the economic isolation of Iran and Libya are warranted, and this bill takes U.S. Policy in the
right direction." Id.
63. Id. To illustrate, Senator Hamilton saw two problems: first, the possibility of the reduction in international cooperation in isolating Iran and
Libya; second, costly consequences of the building resentment among other
countries. Id.
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nomic isolation.' Nonetheless, the United States must be prepared to defend the viability of the Act, since many countries continue to engage in business transactions with Iran and Libya,
thereby indirectly providing economic support for state-sponsored
terrorist activities."
Finally, the Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1996
is currently pending in Congress." Although this legislation does
not satisfy the need for comprehensive protective measures, 7 failing the expectations of some,' it contains significant improvements to United States' aviation security." The Act provides for
the criminal background check of airport employees,"0 and mandates the nation's airports to use the best explosives detectors
available.7 ' The Act also requires the employment of bomb-sniffing
dogs in the country's largest airports. 72 Furthermore, the Act
guarantees supplemental funding to support the implementation
of airport security."
64. 142 CONG. REC. H8125-01 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Roth); Nelan et al., supra note 58, at 26.
65. Nelan et al., supra note 58, at 26. For example, Turkey's Prime Minister recently contracted with Iran to purchase $23 billion worth of Iranian gas.
Id.
66. H.R. 3953, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); 142 CONG. REc. H9886-01
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996). See also Paul Mann, Senate to Weigh Terrorism Bill,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Aug. 12, 1996, at 34.
67. See 142 CONG. REC. H9890 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Shuster) (proclaiming that this bill is "not a panacea. It is but a step in the
right direction.").
68. Id. at H9891 (statement of Sen. Hefner, a member of the Committee on
Appropriation).
Here we have a bill that nobody knows anything about, that does nothing and, if you vote against it, you are going to have commercials run
against you that say you are soft on terrorism. In the meantime, nothing is going to happen that deters terrorism. This is a sad day in our
country when people are out there grieving because they have lose loved
ones in these terrorist acts, and we are doing something that absolutely
does nothing. It is strictly a political document. That is a sad day in
this body.
Id.
69. See 142 CONG. REC. H9886-01 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996). See generally
Shirlyce Manning, The United States'Response to InternationalAir Safety, 61
J. AIR L. & COM. 505 (1995) (discussing air safety measures prior to the enactment of the Aviation Security and Antiterrorism Act).
70. H.R. 3953, title I, § 102;142 CONG. REC. H9886-01 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1996).
71. H.R. 3953, title I, § 101; 142 CONG. REC. H9886.
72. H.R. 3953, title I, § 107; 142 CONG. REC. H9887.
73. H.R. 3953, title I, § 106; 142 CONG. REC. H9887.
I rise in strong support of this legislation... [T]he Aviation Security and
Antiterrorism Act makes several needed improvements to our Nation's
aviation security system. This legislation will require bomb-sniffing
dogs to be used at the 50 largest airports in the Nation. It directs the
Federal Aviation Administration to deploy the best available bomb de-
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C. InternationalEfforts Aimed at Combating Terrorism
Although nations around the world have intensified their efforts in combating international terrorism, the United Nations remains the most important forum for international cooperation."'
In 1996, the United Nations took steps to restrain Sudan, a longtime state-sponsor of international terrorism, by imposing an air
embargo on Sudan because its government failed to comply with
previous extradition requests."5 In the same year, two separate
diplomatic meetings took place in Egypt to focus on resolving the
issue of combating terrorism. The first involved the leaders of
twenty-two Arab countries; the second involved the G-7 joined by
Russia.7" Although the Arab conference's members treated certain
underground terrorist groups as legitimate opposition movements,
they explicitly excluded from this category guerrilla organizations,
such as Hamas and Hezbollah.7 The G-7 and Russia also met in
France to continue their dialogue on terrorism issues.78 As a result
of the meeting in Lyon, the member-countries adopted twenty-five
practical resolutions, relating to an intelligence sharing agreement, strengthened Internet communications security and increased safety of public transportation. 79 Notwithstanding these
efforts, the prosecution of international terrorists and their sponsors remains extremely difficult."' Therefore, criminal laws are
tection equipment at airports here at home-similar to equipment that
is now being used at several airports in Europe and Israel. The bill also
requires airport baggage screeners to undergo in-depth security background checks before they are hired... [T]he bill also directs the FBI to
work closely with the FAA on security measures at our Nation's airports.
142 CONG. REC. H9886-01, H9891 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Duncan).
74. Secretary-General Says New Forms of International Cooperation Required to Meet Global Issues, FED. NEWS SERV., May 31, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File. The United Nations adopted Resolution
1070 which imposed an air embargo on Sudan because it did not comply with
previous extradition requests. Security Council to Impose Aircraft Sanctions
on Sudan in 90 Days if Country Fails to Comply with ExtraditionDemands
FED. NEWS SERV., Aug. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews
File.
75. Id. The Resoultion, along with future possible sanctions, were designed
to ensure Sudan's cooperation with the Security Council's call for the extradition of three Ethiopian men suspected of attempting to assassinate the President of Egypt in June of 1996. Id.
76. Arab Terrorist ExtraditionReform Urged, U.P.I., July 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews File.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Joseph Dellapenna, InternationalTerrorism:Prevention and Remedies:
Legal Remedies for Terrorist Acts, 22 SYRACUSE J. INTL L. & COM. 13, 13

(1996). Professor Dellapenna asserts that a resolution of an international terrorism dispute involving individuals, via litigation or arbitration, in an inter-
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needed to deter terrorism sponsorship in the United States.
III. STATES EFFORTS IN ENACTING ANTITERRORISM LEGISLATION
While Illinois is currently the only state to enact a legislative
measure combating international terrorism, several other states
have attempted or are attempting to pass similar laws. This Part
addresses both the attempts by several states to adopt measures to
cut off private funding to international terrorists, and the enacted
Illinois law. This Part begins with a discussion of the only state
antiterrorism legislation currently enacted, section 5/29C of the
Illinois Criminal Code, and concludes with an examination of
Maryland and Wisconsin's legislative endeavors.
A. The Illinois Experience
While Illinois lawmakers did not succeed in their initial attempts to enact an antiterrorism law, by the Spring of 1996, the
General Assembly acknowledged the need for state antiterrorism
legislation. This controversial legislation which Governor Edgar
signed into law in July 1996, is currently the single state measure
in the struggle against sponsorship of international terrorism.
1.

The Illinois "Solicitationfor CharityAct"

The Solicitation for Charity Act was Illinois' first attempt to
criminalize private parties' support of international terrorism.8'
Prompted by the Hamas-orchestrated bloodshed in Israel in October of 1994,2 and disillusioned by the inaction of the United States
government,83 Jewish organizations in Chicago took steps to initiate legislation that would punish the funding of international terrorists."s Presented to the Illinois House Judiciary Committee in
national forum remains to be a most ineffective endeavor. Id. at 14-15. In the
event a sponsoring state is deciphered, an attempt to bring the state to justice for the acts committed by the accused terrorists is also a practical impossibility. Id. at 15-16.
81. H.B. 667, 89th Gen. Ass. (IIl. 1995).
82. See Hamas:Attack Was to Avenge Mosque Killing, U.P.I., Oct. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnews File (discussing the Hamas'
bombing of Jerusalem's streets which claimed two lives and left 13 wounded);

Another Tel Aviv Explosion Victim Dies, U.P.I., Oct. 23, 1994, available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnews File (describing an attack on Israeli civilians
in Tel Aviv for which Hamas took responsibility); The Week in Review: Tel
Aviv Bombing Disrupts Peace Process, (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 23,
1994) (transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnews File) (discussing
the Hamas terrorist action in Tel Aviv).
83. 1996 111. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
108th Legis. day (Mar. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lang).
84. Interview with Professor Ralph Ruebner, co-author of the Illinois antiterrorism law, in Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 16, 1996). The Illinois legislature
was anxious to enact a measure deterring and punishing unlawful contributors and solicitors of support to international terrorists, because no other
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January of 1995, the Bill undertook to curtail funding to international terrorist organizations by proposing a new section-225
ILCS 460/9.5 of the Illinois Criminal Code-entitled "The Solicitation for Charity Act.""' The Bill provided that the Attorney General may obtain an injunction to cease a charitable organization's
fundraising activities if he or she "ha[d] a reason to believe"" that
the charity solicited funds that "may be used to support an organization that engages in international terrorism... ."7 Additionally,
the Bill would have amended the Illinois Criminal Code by penalizing solicitation of funds in support of a party or an organization
which engages in international terrorism."
The language of the Bill required specific intent of the offender as an element of the crime. 9 The Bill would have penalized
state or federal laws dealt with the issue competently. H.B. 3233, 89th Gen.
Ass. (Il1. 1996).
85. H.B. 667, § 9.5. The legislators intended to cut short fundraising efforts of certain Illinois charities who were suspected of channeling resources
to international terrorist organizations. 1995 Ill. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess.
House of Representatives transcript. 38th Legis. day (Mar. 24, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Schoenberg). If passed into law, the Act would have been
the government's instrument in taking away such charities' tax-exempt
status. Id.
86. H.B. 667, § 9.5. During the Bill's third reading, Representatives Moore
questioned the magnitude and omnipotence of the Attorney General's office in
determining whether an entity or an individual should be prosecuted under
the proposed law. 1995 Ill. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript. 38th Legis. day (Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moore).
87. H.B. 667, § 9.5. The Bill proposed the following amendment to 225
ILCS 460/9.5:
When the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person,
charitable organization, professional fund raiser, or professional solicitor is engaged in soliciting or collecting funds on behalf of an organization that engages in international terrorism, he or she may bring in the
circuit court an action in the name and on behalf of the people of the
State of Illinois against the person or organization to enjoin the person
or organization from continuing the solicitation or collection or doing
any acts in furtherance of the collection or solicitation, to cancel any
registration statement previously filed with the Attorney General, and
to confiscate the assets that were solicited or collected by the person or
organization in the State of Illinois and utilize those assets for charitable purposes.
Id. The authors of the Bill defined a charitable organization as:
Any benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary person or one
purporting to be such which solicits and collects funds for charitable
purposes and includes each local, county, or area division within this
State of such charitable organization, provided such local, county, or
area division has authority and discretion to disburse funds or property
otherwise than by transfer to any parent organization.
Id. § 1(a).
88. Id.
89. Id. A charity is guilty of this offense where it "[knew] or ha[d] a reason
to believe that moneys solicited... will support, in whole or in part, an organization that engages in international terrorism." Id.
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a contributor only if he or she "knew or had a reason to believe"
that his contribution will go to an organization that "engages in international terrorism."' However, it became apparent that the
Bill would not withstand First Amendment scrutiny associated
with the recognized right to freedom of association and other constitutional guarantees." The Bill's language could have been construed to implicate charitable activities of international terrorist
organizations, such as operations of hospitals and soup-kitchens.
As such, the Bill provided an opportunity for persecutions based on
"guilt by association."93 Furthermore, the Bill vested total discretionary power in the Attorney General allowing him or her to determine whether the charity's solicitation was intended to fund
terrorists.' Such unlimited power guarantees at least a potential,
if not a purposeful, abuse of discretion.
As a result, even though the Bill passed the House Judiciary
Committee in March 1995, 9' it was referred back to the Illinois
Senate Judiciary Committee in May." Experiencing pressure from
national and local opponents of the measure," the authors
amended the Bill and its sponsors presented it to the House
Committee again in March 1996. 9'
2. The Illinois "InternationalTerrorism"Act

Representatives Cross and Erwin introduced the second version of the law, entitled "International Terrorism," after the
90. Id.
91. 1995 Ml1.
89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
38th Legis. day (Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Currie).
92. Id. Some of the major concerns raised at the third reading of this
House Bill reflected the shortcomings of the language of the proposed law resulting in its vagueness. Id. Representative Currie, for example, was perturbed by the lack of the definition of international terrorism in the Bill itself,
the application of which could have resulted in persecution of members of either non-violent groups or peaceful branches of some militant resistance
movements. Id.
93. See infra notes 157-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association.
94. 1995 Ill. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
38th Legis. day (Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moore).
95. H.B. 667. The Bill passed the Committee by 91 votes of "yes" against
14 votes of"no" and 7 votes of "present." Id.
96. H.B. 667.
97. Interview with Professor Ralph Ruebner, supra note 84. Among those
vigorously opposing the Bill were the Illinois chapters of the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Anti-Defamation League, the Council on Domestic Relations and the Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights. Id. At the
Bill's third reading in the House of Representatives, the Bill's sponsors debated not only the Bill's viability with respect to its language, but also its policy issues. 89th 111. Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
38th Legis. day (Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cross).
98. H.B. 3233, § 29C-5, 89th Gen. Ass. (Il1.1996).
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authors" amended the first version by deleting the "Charity Solicitation Act" section." Similar to the first draft, the second draft
also aimed at preventing international terrorism by penalizing
individual and private group solicitation and contribution of support for international terrorists' activities."° However, instead of
referring to an established definition of international terrorism,
the authors defined its meaning directly in the text of the Bill, effectively eliminating the possibility of unconstitutional vagueness.'0 The new draft also provided the definition of "material
The authors also amended the portion of H.B. 667
support."'
dealing with solicitations and contributions by eliminating the requirement that the funding would be used by a group that
"engages in international terrorism. " "
The new draft of the Bill omitted the discretionary powers of
the law enforcement agencies by requiring that solicitors and donors channel funds to "plan, prepare, carry out, or escape from an
act or acts of international terrorism."' °8 The second draft also included a more stringent mental state requirement. Rather than
requiring that an offender had "reason to believe" that he or she
was supporting terrorist activities,'07 the revised Bill now required
a showing that he or she intended a donation to go toward an act

99. The co-authors of the law are Professor Ralph Ruebner of The John
Marshall Law School in Chicago and Mr. Jeffrey Weill of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) of Chicago.
100. H.B. 3233
101. H.B. 3233.
102. H.B. 667. In the first draft of the Bill, the authors referred the reader
to the already established definitions of international terrorism in accordance
with sections of the Illinois and United States Criminal Codes. Id.

103. H.B. 3233, § 29C-5.

The earlier version of the law defined

"international terrorism" as:
Activities that (i) involve a violent act or acts dangerous to human life
that would be a felony under the laws of the State of Illinois if committed within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois; and (ii) occur outside
the United States; and (iii) appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce
a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of government by assassination or
kidnapping.
Id. This definition reflected the concept of terrorism as a crime committed by
private parties. H.B. 3233 (March 26th version). The new amendment specified that international terrorist activities are "perpetrated [only] by a private
person or non-governmental entity." Id.
104. H.B. 3233 defined "material support" as "currency or the financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets." Id.
§ 29C-5.
105. H.B. 667, § 9.5.
106. H.B. 3233, § 29C-10(a).
107. H.B. 667, § 9.5.
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Finally, Section 29C-15(b)(2) specifically excluded

from investigation all constitutionally protected nonviolent activities that advance "political, religious, philosophical, or ideological
goals or beliefs of any person or group. " "
Nonetheless, some of the provisions of the second draft remained constitutionally problematic."' The February and March
versions of the law's second draft defined international terrorism
as an "activit[y] that... appear[s] to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population ... ."" As presented, the terminology
opened the door to discretionary interpretations, once again raising an issue of vagueness."2 Furthermore, the investigation provision allowed law enforcement agencies to inquire into a party's
actions if the "facts reasonably indicated" that the party was
"about to engage in the violation of this or any other criminal law"
of Illinois.1"3 Similarly, the potentially broad interpretation of this
provision called into question its constitutionality.""
While only four representatives voted against the passage of
the Bill in March 1996,"1 the authors continued to work on the
language of the Bill". by either rephrasing or deleting all the terminology that gave rise to concerns of some representatives."7 Instead of requiring that the prohibited activity "appear[ed] to be intended to intimidate or coerce," the clause now read to include only
activities that "are intended" to procure such a result."8 Additionally, the provision covering the investigative powers now
permitted an inquiry only into the affairs of persons who
"intentionally engag[e] or has engaged" in illegal activities, solving
the problem of an overly broad grant of discretion to law enforcement agencies."9 Consequently, the Illinois Senate agreed with
108. H.B. 3233, § 29C-10(a).
109. Id. § 29C-15(b)(2).
110. 1996 Ill. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript,
108th Legis. day (Mar. 26, 1996).
111. H.B. 3233, § 29C-5.
112. 1996 Ill. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
108th Legis. day (Mar. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Scott). Rep. Cross, one of
the sponsors of the Bill's second draft, defended the viability of the definition,
reasoning that the provision concerning investigative powers was drafted to
ensure the law's enforcement powers, so that the law would serve not only as
a deterrent but also as a prosecutorial mechanism. Id. (statement of Rep.
Cross).
113. H.B. 3233, § 29C-15(b)..
114. 1996 IMI.89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript.
108th Legis. day (Mar. 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Scott).
115. Id.
116. 1996 IIl. 89th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. House of Representatives transcript, 130th Legis. day (May 14, 1996) (statement of Rep. Cross) (statement
of Rep. Long).
117. Id.
118. H.B. 3233, § 29C-5.
119. Id. § 29C-15(b).
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the House of Representatives as to the Bill's constitutionality and
passed the measure by a unanimous vote on May 14, 1996.20
B. Maryland'sand Wisconsin'sEfforts

Although to date the Illinois law is the only state antiterrorism measure enacted, Maryland and Wisconsin also sought to enact similar legislation. 121 Prompted by the reports of Hamas fundraising activities in Springfield, Virginia,n Maryland legislators
presented H.B. 973 to the House Judiciary Committee in February, 1996.L The Bill was aimed at deterring and penalizing fundraising for international terrorism purposes by making such activities a felony.'2'
While the drafters of the Bill carefully enunciated virtually
every element of the offense,L= the language of the definitions
made the Bill's constitutionality even more dubious than that of
the first draft of the Illinois law. 26 First, according to the Bill's
terminology, a mere promise to support international terrorism
qualified as a contribution sufficient for a conviction.m7 The language of the Bill also provided that an international terrorist organization may be operating within the United States, thus blurring the distinction between international and domestic
terrorism. Lu Most significantly, an organization could have qualified for a terrorist label without having for its goal unlawful intimidation or violence.' Consequently, H.B. 973 justifiably raised
120. Id.
121. Telephone Interview with Lauren Kallins, lobbyist for Baltimore Jewish Council (Sept. 25, 1996). Telephone interview with Mark Graul, Office of
Representative Mark Green, Wisconsin State Assembly (Sept. 25, 1996).
122. David Conn, Safe Passage?,BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at
18. By the beginning of 1996, the U.S. State Department confirmed the reports of Hamas fundraising in Springfield, Virginia. Id.
123. H.B. 973, 1996 Leg. Sess. The Baltimore Jewish Council supported the
Bill's three sponsors, Delegates Samuel I. Rosenberg, Kenneth C. Montague
Jr. and Frank S. Turner. Conn, supra note 122, at 18.
124. H.B. 973, § 2(C). In addition to the confirmed reports that Hamas'
fundraising has been taking place in Maryland's "backyard," Maryland lawmakers were adamant about helping along the AEDPA of 1996, a piece of federal legislation, which at the time "ha[d] been stalled in Congress." Telephone
Interview with Lauren Kallins, supra note 121.
125. H.B. 973, § 1(B).
126. Conn, supra note 122, at 18. At the House Judiciary Committee hearing on the viability of the proposed legislation, the members were concerned
that the permissiveness of Bill's language would undermine people's constitutional guarantees and in particular their freedoms of association and religion.
Id.
127. H.B. 973, § 1(A)(2). "Contribution means the gift, transfer or promise
of: (I) money; (II) property or services... ; or (III) any other thing or value. Id.
128. Id. § 1(A)(3)(I). International Terrorist organization is "() originated
and is primarily active outside the United States...." Id.
129. Id. § 1(A)(3)(II). "International terrorist organization means an or-
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constitutional concerns 3 ' among Maryland's lawmakers who out-

right denied its passage in Committee. 8'
Although Wisconsin was unsuccessful in its initial attempts at
introducing antiterrorism legislation, proponents are hopeful that
an antiterrorism bill, similar to the new Illinois law, will be enacted by the end of 1997. .'2 However, the Illinois antiterrorism
law currently remains the only state legislation designed to combat the solicitation or contribution of funds to international terrorists.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ILLINOIS ANTITERRORISM LAW
As is the case with many controversial pieces of legislation,
the constitutionality of the Illinois antiterrorist law may be challenged. Those opposed to the law may claim that the law contravenes various constitutionally protected principles. Accordingly,
this Part examines those grounds upon which an individual or
group may front a constitutional attack upon Illinois' new law.
This Part begins with a discussion of why the definitions used in
the Illinois law are not, as some may claim, vague and arbitrary.
This Part then examines the various freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Next, this Part canvasses the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures and demonstrates why the Illinois law does
not violate this fundamental constitutional right. Finally, this
Part concludes with discussion of Supremacy Clause concerns relating to the federal preemption doctrine.
A. FirstAmendment Concerns
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reflects the
desire of the Framers to restrain Congress from infringing upon
people's freedom of expression and freedom of religion."' This
ganization that :... uses international terrorism as a means to achieve a desired political or social objective." Id.
130. Conn, supra note 122, at 18. While House legislators possibly were not
concerned about the Bill's implications on right-wing military groups in the
United States, they were apprehensive about the Bill's ramifications on the
Maryland supporters of the IRA and Nation of Islam. Id. Delegate Dana Lee
Dembrow questioned the Bill's reasonableness with respect to AmericanBosnian Muslims' fundraising for the purpose of defending against the Serbs.
Id.
131. H.B. 973, 1996 Leg. Sess. On March 11, 1996, Maryland's House Judiciary Committee reported the Bill unfavorably. Id.
132. Telephone Interview with Mark Graul, Office of Representative Mark
Green, Wisconsin State Assembly (Apr. 8, 1997). Mr. Graul stated that his
office intended to introduce an antiterrorism Bill, similar to the new Illinois
law, to the House of Representatives by the end of April 1997. Id.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
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same principle is applied to state legislatures through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'4 However, such
protection is not absolute and it would not, for example, shield
"a
"
man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. la
Even before its'enactment, the Illinois antiterrorism law
evoked several concerns with respect to the law's constitutional
validity. Opponents argued that the law would chill the constitutionally guaranteed rights of free speech. 36 Moreover, they alleged
that the law created guilt by association, when a person donating
funds is a member of religious group sympathetic to an international terrorist organization operating overseas 37 Additionally,
opponents are likely to challenge the law's potential invasion of
people's freedom of religion. Accordingly, this Section deals with
these concerns and demonstrates how the Illinois law overcomes
these constitutional hurdles.
1.

The Constitutionalityof the Law's Definitions

Although opponents of the first version of the Illinois law
challenged its constitutionality by contending that the definition of
international terrorism rendered the legislation vague and subject
to arbitrary enforcement, 8 the argument is meritless against the
newly enacted version. Public interest groups have criticized the
law's definition of international terrorism on the basis that it could
be applied to prosecute American civilians in their attempts to resolve private grievances occurring overseas.'
Such reading of the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." Id. For a discussion of the First Amendment guarantees, see Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J.
1293, 1310 (1993) (discussing the distinction between speech and conduct and
under what circumstances the latter is entitled to protection); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1205, 1207-08 (1983) (outlining a historical overview of First Amendment jurisprudence as it developed following the First World War); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARv. L. REV. 518, 519 (1970)
(commenting that the Court has and should continue "to extend First
Amendment Due Process beyond obscenity cases").
134. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
135. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (analyzing
whether the Espionage Act of 1917 violated defendants' freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). The Court
held that in time of war inflammatory statements are more dangerous and
therefore less protected than if published during peaceful times. Id. at 52.
The Court upheld defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act and interfere with the U.S. military recruitment efforts. Id. at 53.
136. Letter from Mary Dixon, Legislative and Chapter Director, American
Civil Liberties Union, to Jim Edgar, Governor of Illinois (July 11, 1996) (on
file with The John Marshall Law Review).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. Ms. Dixon argues that a mother who pays to have her child kidnapped and returned to her from an overseas' location would face interna-
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law's definition misconstrues both the meaning and the purpose of
the law. While the law's definition of international terrorism
authorizes the prosecution of a person funding a political kidnapping executed outside of the United States, it does not permit
similar prosecution for kidnapping of a child, as lacking in
"intimidat[ion] or coerc[ion] of the population or undermin[ing] the
government," element, a necessary element of the definition. 140
However, if the fundraising efforts discussed in the introductory
hypothetical led to the kidnapping of the Prime Minister of Xania,
then the Illinois antiterrorism law would apply.
Most importantly, by requiring the element of intent to fund
an act of international terrorism, the law dispenses with the possibility of potential encroachment upon First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court has long held that by including the element of
scienter or knowledge, the legislature would avoid imposition of
strict criminal liability on the offender, consequently inhibiting his
or her constitutionally protected expression." 1 Therefore, the new
Illinois law safeguards the constitutional freedoms of potential
suspects by requiring that they donate support intending to advance a terrorist activity.
2. Freedom of Expression

The First Amendment protects conduct as an expression of an
individual's ideological beliefs. 1 2 The forms of expressive conduct
that are protected have expanded significantly over the years. 3
tional terrorism charges under the Illinois law's definition of international
terrorism. Id.
140. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (1996). Section (iii) of the law defines international
terrorist activity to be "intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the
conduct of government by assassination or kidnapping." Id.
141. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966). In Mishkin, a publisher was convicted for unlawful possession of obscene materials. Id. at 50405. The Court upheld his conviction relying on the evidence that the defendant knew of the obscene character of the materials, noting that the defendant's scienter helped avoid self-censorship and protected his First Amendment rights. Id. at 512. See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55
(1959) (reviewing the conviction of a bookstore proprietor for dealing in obscene material in violation of a Los Angeles city ordinance). The city ordinance made it unlawful to possess any indecent materials regardless of a
violator's scienter. Id. at 148-49. The Court held that dispensing with the requirement of knowledge of the contents by the bookseller of the book inhibited
his constitutionally protected freedom of expression. Id. at 154-55.
142. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398-99 (1989).
143. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 370, 391 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting expressions of hatred on private or public property, including but not limited to cross-burning and exhibiting swastikas); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 168 (1992) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits states from using defendant's membership in a Nazi
organization to prove his guilt in murder trial); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420
(holding that as long as it does not threaten public safety, burning of a flag is
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Although the Court continues to hold that speaking and writing
enjoy far greater constitutional protection,1" the Court preserves
the constitutionality of solicitation and contribution of funds for
charitable purposes.14
Solicitation or contribution may fall under the classification of
either "commercial speech," 46 "speech plus conduct,"' 7 or "group
economic activity.""
However, while such activity is constitua form of expression protected by the First Amendment).
144. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978).
145. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507 U.S. 410, 420 (1993). The
Court stated that such expression qualifies for First Amendment protection
where "money is spent to project" certain ideas. Id. See also William P. Marshall, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't and Religious Solicitation: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Religion Converge, 13 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 953, 960, 973 (1980). In Schaumburg, the Court stated that where
money is solicited or contributed, such an expression of support is in effect an
advocacy of a specific cause. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S 620, 632 (1980).
146. The term "commercial speech" is defined as "speech which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463
U.S. 60, 66 (1983). The Court has held that Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutional forms of expression.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56 (1978). Furthermore, where the government intends to restrict commercial speech, the relationship between government interest and the means by which it is achieved must be that of a "reasonable
fit." Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). See also Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. at 424 (holding that the city was not justified in placing restrictions on the operation of street newsracks because the city failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between ensuring street safety and the means selected for the advancement of this legitimate interest); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding that where
a governmental intrusion is not accomplished via the least restrictive means,
it could still pass the constitutional muster if narrowly tailored). For a detailed discussion of commercial speech and its constitutionality, see T.M.
Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. PITT.
L. REV. 519, 541 (1979) ("[commercial speech deserves less than full first
amendment protection because] we regard the government as much less partisan in the competition between commercial firms than in the struggle between religious or political views."). Cf. Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech,
Constitutionalism,Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317 (1988).
147. "Speech plus conduct," or symbolic speech is a person's symbolic behavior aimed at the expression of his political or other views. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (asserting that
protesters' overnight stay in a public park can be a form of speech-related
conduct); Spence v. Washington 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (determining that a
peace symbol attached to the flag conformed with the definition of symbolic
speech).
148. The term "group economic activity" may be used to describe a boycott.
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911-13 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court considered whether a politically motivated boycott organized by the NAACP members qualifies for the First
Amendment protection. Id. at 889-91. The Court held that while "[tihe First
Amendment does not protect violence," the peaceful boycott activities deserve
the constitutional shield. Id. at 916.
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tionally protected, neither solicitation nor contribution of "material
support" qualifies for full constitutional protection, which is generally afforded only to speaking and writing."9 Instead, the Supreme Court has established that the federal government and the
states may regulate such hybrid forms of expression if such regu-

lation furthers a sufficient state interest, and the restrictions imposed are no more constricting than necessary. 15°
Furthermore, the First Amendment does not protect a form of
expression that is intended to produce "imminent, lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." 5' In cases of solicitation and contribution of funds, the Supreme Court has also
stated that the size of the contribution is irrelevant, as the sym149. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (striking down a state statute proscribing advertisements of prescription drugs' prices). See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1973) (upholding a
ban on sex-related advertisements in the help-wanted section of a newspaper).
The PittsburghPress Court held that the Constitution will not protect speech
that advocates an illegal business transaction. Id.
150. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)
(upholding a state regulation closely tailored to achieve a worthy state interest of eliminating gender discrimination); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17
(1976) (holding that where government's interests were wholly unrelated to
its means for advancing the interests, the regulation could not stand); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that not all expressive
conduct is constitutionally protected, and that government may regulate such
conduct where it furthers a compelling state interest by the means that are
least restrictive); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (holding that
where a state's regulation did not advance a sufficient interest, the regulation
did not satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment). In fact, the Court
applies balancing approach: the greater the infringement on a constitutionally
protected freedom, the greater the burden to show justification for such encroachment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. See also Dennis v. United States,
183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In Dennis, the court
addressed the issue of whether a law which prohibited association with the
Communist Party was constitutionally sound. Id. at 205. In upholding the
constitutionality of this federal anti-subversive law, Chief Judge Learned
Hand developed a formula to apply to each case's facts. Id. at 212. According
to this formula, each case is to be decided on its own facts, and where the
"gravity of 'evil' discounted by its improbability" outweighs the harm of intrusion into the freedom of speech, such intrusion is deemed warranted. Id. On
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson upheld the Smith Act
as a timely governmental response to the "clear and present danger" of the
Communist threat. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515 (1951). Thus,
the threat of Communism during that era was similar to the contemporary
threat of terrorism, justifying swift constitutional measures.
151. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). While freedom of
speech enjoys absolute constitutional protection, speech which incites violence
does not justify such preservation. Id. It is axiomatic that advocacy of a theoretical principle is absolutely protected by the Constitution, whereas a call for
actual performance of such principle is not. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 318-19 (1957). See also Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear
and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 209.
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bolism of the gesture is the only relevant factor in adjudging the
availability of the constitutional shield.lu
The new Illinois law does not invade the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Opponents argue that the law
chills free speech rights of those who would otherwise choose to
solicit for or contribute their support to terrorist organizations.'
Inapposite to this contention, the new law proscribes only contributions that are intended to maintain and fuel violent acts,
"dangerous to human life.... that would be a felony" under Illinois
law."M Moreover, a person soliciting or contributing support must
intend for the resources to fund a terrorist attack." For example,
if Mr. Y requested donations from the fellowship members following a video presentation depicting starving children and ailing elderly people, the requirement of intent would not be satisfied.
Similarly, if Ms. X was overcome by sympathy and gave a check for
fifty dollars to sponsor one of the children, the crucial element of
intent would also be lacking. Significantly, the authors of the law
included specific intent as a requisite element of the offense even
though legal precedent does not require such explicit determination."
Consequently, the new Illinois law regulates only such expressions that are unlawful by design, as the link between soliciting or donating funds for terrorist activities and actual attacks is
easily detected. In fact, the law recognizes that deadly terrorist
attacks would be practically impossible without such sponsorship.
Thus, the law does not implicate the First Amendment guaranteed
freedom of expression because solicitation or contribution with intent to aid terrorists in killing more innocent victims does not
qualify for any constitutional protection.
3. Freedom of Association
Freedom of association, while not expressly enumerated in
the U.S. Constitution, is implicit in the First Amendment.157 However, the Constitution does not afford absolute protection to the
people's right to assemble and associate." Furthermore, while
152. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
153. Id.
154. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (1996).
155. Id.
156. Ralph Ruebner & Jeffrey Weill, Combating International Terrorism
While Protecting ConstitutionalRights: An Analysis of the Illinois Legislation,
in CONFRONTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE

ILLINOIS MODEL 34 (Jewish Community Relations Council ed., 1996).
157. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). "Itis beyond debate that

freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is
an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
158. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). Where a
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punishing membership in an organization ordinarily creates "guilt
by association,"' " under certain circumstances criminal charges resulting from such membership may be justified."6 If the government can show that the person charged is an active member of an
organization whose illegal goals he was intentionally furthering,
his or her freedom of association is not violated.81
Moreover, the government must also show that the group's
objective was not to simply advocate, but actually instigate, an illegal action."a However, such illegal action need not come to fruition before the instigator loses his constitutionally guaranteed
right of association."
Ordinarily, the punishment is imposed
based not on subsequent injurious actions, but on the sole fact of
instigation.'" Unless a suspect is a member of a "legitimate" organization, courts may exhibit extreme deference to the legislature, adopting measures in response to threats to U.S. national security. '
The new Illinois law does not overstep the bounds of the freedom of association. Although the law's opponents claim that it
creates "guilt by association," in effect punishing mere memberstate cannot reach its meaningful goals without somewhat restricting people's

freedom of association, such restriction may be justified as long as it is
.unrelated to the suppression of ideas," and the state's goals could not be
reached via other avenues. Id.
159. For full discussion of the concept of "guilt by association" in terrorism
context, see Keisha A. Gary, Note, Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by
Association: An Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227
(1994) (outlining the history of certain legislation that gave rise to the concept
of guilt by association, including the Immigration Act of 1903, the Alien Regis-

tration Act of 1940, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the McCarran-Walter

Act).
160. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 205 (1961). In Scales, the lower
court convicted the defendant under the membership clause of the Smith Act
as a member of the Communist Party. Id. at 205-06. The Court affirmed defendant's conviction because the defendant was an active member of the organization and knew of the Party's plans for violent overthrow of the Government. Id.
161. Id. at 220.
162. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297 (1961).
163. Scales, 367 U.S. at 251-54.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 81 (1961) (upholding the compelled disclosure of Communist Party
membership list under the Subversive Activities Control Act); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128 (1959) (upholding a contempt conviction for
defendant's refusal to answer question concerning his association with the
Communist Party members). On the opposite side of the scale is the strict
scrutiny standard, applicable where a group under investigation is considered
"legitimate." See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 548-49 (1963). In Gibson, the Court stated that before a disclosure of
NAACP membership information could be compelled, the government must
"convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and
a subject of overriding and compelling state interest." Id. at 546.
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ship in an organization,'" the law does not implicate associational
freedom. Significantly, the new Illinois law implicates only support for illegal, violent activities conducted on foreign soil. The
law's definition of international terrorism impliedly protects support for the lawful actions of sovereign nations by explaining that
international terrorism applies only to "private person[s] or nongovernmental entit[ies]" perpetrating activities that are
"dangerous to human life." 67 Hence, the law does not implicate Illinois' residents' freedom to associate with independent nations
who are conducting legitimate activities and with individuals who
act lawfully.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.," the U.S. Supreme
Court established guidelines for determining whether by prohibiting a certain activity a law creates "guilt by association.""6 While
a law may not punish association without more, it may proscribe
association with an organization whose members strive to advance
the group's violent goals.7
Clearly, the new Illinois legislation
adheres to the guidelines of the test. To illustrate, Mr. Y would
not be guilty of the offense if he asked for money following a presentation on the need for medical supplies at the Antixanian hospitals. Similarly, Ms. X would not be guilty of the offense if she contributed fifty dollars for the construction of a new Antixanian
school building.
Furthermore, according to the law's explicit language, both
the solicitor and the contributor must intend for the donation to
further an act of violent international terrorism.17 ' Therefore, it is
impertinent that the militant branch of Antixanians is active in its
struggle against Xanians, as long as Ms. X and Mr. Y's intentions
were purely humanitarian. Consequently, the new Illinois law penalizes only illegal conduct and as such, does not violate constitutionally protected freedom of association.
4. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion holds a distinct place among the enumerated constitutional guarantees.17 The Supreme Court has long
166. Dixon, supra note 136, at 3.
167. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (1996).
168. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
169. Id. at 920.
170. Id.
171. 720 ILCS 5/29C (1996).
172. See, e.g., George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520-21 (1983) (discussing
history of definition of religion; from the Founding Fathers who equated religion with "theism," to the Supreme Court's understanding religion as a relation
to the one's Creator); Jesse H. Choper, Defining 'Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 580 (arguing that the society is in need
of not only a standard definition of religion for purposes of both traditional
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held that while the First Amendment unconditionally protects a
person's religious beliefs, acts in furtherance of such beliefs may be
regulated."' It is axiomatic that a law does not violate a person's
right to free exercise of religion if the law does not specifically target the religion in its application. 7'
However, where a law is neither neutral nor of general applicability, its application may be justified only if used to enforce a
compelling governmental interest with the least restrictive means
available.'75 In 1990, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
"compelling interest" test vis-a-vis the question of the constitutionality of a criminal law proscribing the use of a drug used in religious ceremonies.'76 Following the Court's precedent established
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,' the state is no longer required to show a compel-

ling interest in its attempts to regulate its citizens' conduct, where
that conduct would potentially threaten public safety.7 ' The Court
stressed that a person may not evade compliance with criminal
laws by invoking the right to free exercise of his religion.' However, in 1993, Congress revived the compelling interest test when

and nonconformist groups, but also for a uniform "legal" definition of religion);
Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1089 (1978) (advocating movement away from the formalistic definition of religion and toward a functional one, which would allow more freedom for the
expression of the individuals' beliefs). One of the most concise determinative
tests is one by the Supreme Court defining a religious belief as "sincere and
meaningful [which] occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God...." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 166 (1965).
173. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). In Cantwell, the defendant, a Jehovah Witness, approached two Catholic men on the street and
attempted to persuade them to change religion. Id. at 300-02. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction for breach of the peace, holding that the
statute prohibiting religious solicitation without a license unconstitutionally
restricted defendant's peaceful endeavors. Id. at 304, 306.
174. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-33 (1993). In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the practices of the
Santeria religion required animal sacrifice. Id. at 524-25. The Court held unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting such sacrifices, reasoning that because it targeted only Santerian religious practices it was neither "neutral"
nor "ofgeneral applicability." Id. at 535-36.
175. Id. at 533.
176. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990). In Employment Division, the petitioner challenged constitutionality of the Oregon statute criminalizing the ingestion of a hallucinogenic drug peyote, often used in religious ceremonies by Native Americans.
Id. at 874. The Court held the statute constitutional, stating that an individual is obligated to comply with valid criminal laws even if it means foregoing
certain religious rituals. Id. at 890.
177. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
178. Id. at 885.
179. Id.
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it enacted The Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 8 '
Regardless of the test applied, a person will not escape prosecution for his or her criminal activity by claiming the right to freedom of religion. If Mr. Y and Ms. X jointly or individually collect
funds intending to further an activity which is considered a felony
in Illinois, they are criminally responsible, regardless of their
ideological or religious motivations. Under the precedent established by Employment Division, Illinois would not be required to
show a compelling state interest. However, if a court follows the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the interest in curtailing terrorism would certainly satisfy the compelling interest requirement. Since the ability of terrorists to launch deadly attacks on
innocent civilians abroad is dependent on receiving funding for
such activities, criminalizing intentional donations is a narrowlytailored means of advancing governmental interest of preventing
such attacks. While international terrorist activity on foreign soil
is ordinarily of concern only to federal authorities, Illinois, and
Chicago in particular, have an interest in such activity as well, after the Chicago Muslim community was named the primary supplier of funding to Hamas. 8' As such, the new Illinois law furthers
a meaningful state interest by restricting criminal activity. Consequently, the new Illinois law satisfies the guidelines of either
test without infringing upon the freedom of religion.
B. FourthAmendment Concerns
The Fourth Amendment preserves the people's right of privacy, implicit in the United States Constitution.81 2 While instituting the requisite safeguards in furtherance of this protection, the
Fourth Amendment regulates searches, seizures and arrests of
suspected criminal offenders."8 The actions of law enforcement officers in invading a person's privacy with a search or seizure are
justified only where such invasions are reasonable.'8
The Supreme Court ascertained that a search is reasonable if it is conducted with a warrant or if it satisfies one of seven other pre180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
181. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hamas
fundraising activities in Chicago.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
183. See ROBERT S. PECK, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERPRETATION 245-48 (1992) (discussing how the requirement of a warrant
is meant to operate as a check on the authority of law enforcement officers).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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determined types of warrantless searches. 5 Where the police conduct a search without a warrant, such an invasion may still be
warranted if it falls under one of the exceptions to the requirement
of securing a warrant. 8 8 The officers may proceed with a warrantless search if they reasonably believe that their safety is threatened,'8 7 to protect evidence from destruction or loss," or if they detain the perpetrator following a "hot pursuit." 9 Additionally,
police officers are not required to obtain a warrant if probable
cause exists for a search incident to a valid arrest,'90 if the incriminating evidence is in "plain view," 9' or if the accused consents to
the search.' The Court also extended the application of warrantless searches to motor vehicles,'93 open spaces,"9 and prisons."'
185. See LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A
CHANGING AMERICA 495-536 (1994) (discussing the eight types of searches and
seizures that the Supreme Court has designated as reasonable).
186. See RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 458 (1994).
187. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). In Terry, a Fourth Amendment milestone case, the Court established the guidelines for "stop and frisk"
searches. Id. at 10. The Court held that the law enforcement officers may
conduct a pat down search of persons they suspect of carrying a weapon. Id.
at 24-25.
188. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). In Cupp, while the police
questioned Murphy, the estranged husband of a murdered woman, a detective
noticed marks on the husband's fingers. Id. at 292. Concerned that Murphy
could remove the stains before the police secured a warrant, the detective
took scrapings from Murphy's nails despite his protests. Id. The Court held
that the detective's actions were justified due to the possibility of destruction
of evidence connecting Murphy to the murder of his wife. Id. at 295.
189. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 (1967). In Warden, the defendant was arrested in his home following a report containing a description
of a robber. Id. Based on this description, the police apprehended the defendant in his home within 30 minutes after the robbery. Id. The Court upheld
the conviction stating that search of the defendant's house without a warrant
was justified as the speedy actions of the police were essential in capturing
the offender. Id. at 298.
190. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969). In Chimel, the police searched a house of a person suspected of a coin shop burglary. Id. While
the officers had a valid arrest warrant, they searched the entire house of the
accused against his protests. Id. The Court held that such investigation was
not warranted, and that the officers could reasonably search only the defendant's person and the immediate vicinity. Id. at 768.
191. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987).
192. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (holding that a hotel
clerk does not have the authority to consent to a search of hotel guest's room).
193. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (holding that law
enforcement officers may search a car, provided that a probable cause for such
a search exists).
194. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (holding that police may conduct warrantless searches of open spaces, like fields, to collect incriminating evidence)
195. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that police
may search incarcerated persons as the prisoners lack expectation of privacy).
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Moreover, in cases of either a magistrate-authorized or a warrantless search, law enforcement officers are justified in invading
the privacy of an accused only if probable cause exists to search
the suspect." Courts usually concede to the existence of the probable cause for a reasonable search where the "totality of the circumstances" is such as to signal probability of criminal activity
under way.'97 In Illinois v. Gates,'98 U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered the application of the then-existing tests with regards to
probable cause. ' By overruling the technical requirements of
probable cause, the Court held that probable cause does not demand a technical examination of its elements, but rather is "a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts....
The Supreme Court outlined the policy behind the limitations
on searches and seizures as one to deter and discipline law enforcement officers from engaging in official misconduct. 20 1 Since
the early twentieth century, the Court has established a remedy to
counteract the unauthorized invasions of privacy by the law enforcement officials, requiring the application of the "exclusionary
rule."2° The rule prohibits admission of all evidence obtained
through an unreasonable search, with the exception of the evi196. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 185, at 496. See also Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 163 (1949); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 411-12 (1969).
197. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983). In Gates, based on an
anonymous letter, Illinois law enforcement officials arrested a couple suspected of drug-dealing. Id. at 227. The letter identified the sale of narcotics
as the wealthy couple's source of income and prompted the police to investigate the Gates' activities. Id. at 225.
198. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
199. Id. at 233-38.
200. Id. at 232.
201. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." Id. at 659. In Aguilar v. Texas,
the Court held that neither federal nor state judiciaries may issue a warrant
in the absence of probable cause for a search. 378 U.S. 108, 115 (1964).
202. PECK, supra note 183, at 252. Before the Court's holding in Weeks v.
United States in 1914, police actions were virtually unsupervised. EPSTEIN &
WALKER, supra note 185, at 536. However, the issue of the exclusionary rule
on the federal level was not settled for almost 35 years, until Wolf v. Colorado
in 1949. Id. at 537. Twelve years later, the Court advised the states that they
also must apply the rule in local court proceedings. Id. at 544. The rule remains a target of criticism by scholars including Justices Cardozo and Burger.
According to Cardozo, "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable had
blundered ....A room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found ....
The privacy of the home has been infringed and the
murderer goes free." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587-88 (N.Y. 1926).

See generally STEVEN SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY

INJUSTICE (1977) (discussing the application of the exclusionary rule).
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dence obtained in "good faith," where an officer believed the search
to be reasonable."°
The Supreme Court has held that a state's powers include the
right to investigate suspected criminal activities of its residents.2"
Moreover, whereas probable cause is necessary for conducting a
reasonable search and seizure, this high standard does not have to
be satisfied in the initial stages of an investigation into an individual's or a group's activities. 5 Finally, the Court has long held that
where there is no showing of objective harm or specific future
harm, an investigation does not constitute a justiciable constitutional claim.2"
The new Illinois law does not expand the investigatory police
powers of the State. The law provides that an investigation into
individual or group activities may be launched when "the facts
reasonably indicate" that intentional solicitation or contribution of
support for international terrorist purposes is under way.207 Accordingly, the law not only guarantees that unconstitutional investigations will not be initiated, but also establishes functional
and sensible standards for investigations that are warranted.
Consider, for example, a situation where a law enforcement
agency acquires information that illegal fundraising activities are
scheduled to occur at a religious service that Ms. X was to attend.
While without more proof, police officers may not search the sanctuary, they may initiate an investigation into the foundation's activities. They may begin surveillance of the building, or any other
public place where services are held. However, the new Illinois
law does not expand authority of the police. All investigations
must still be conducted within the boundaries established by the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the drafters of the new Illinois law provided an
203. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Massachusetts
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
204. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972).
205. United States v. Steinhorn, 739 U.S. 268, 273 (1990). In Steinhorn, the
defendants appealed from conviction for transporting stolen jewelry across
state lines. Id. at 269. The defendants appealed alleging that the law enforcement officers targeted them without "a reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity was afoot. Id. The Court upheld their convictions stating that
such high standard is not required before police may investigate the conduct
of citizens in spheres not protected by notions of privacy. Id. On the contrary,
the Court refused to assume the role of an overseer of police investigatory
tactics by requiring that a reasonable suspicion precede an investigation. Id.
206. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3, 10, 13 (1972). In Laird, the Army surveyed plaintiffs' political demonstration. Id. at 3. The plaintiffs alleged that
such surveillance of a lawful civilian political activity was unconstitutional
because no illegal conduct was taking place. Id. The Court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to a relief because they failed to show any objective
harm from the government's surveillance. Id.
207. 720 ILCS 5/29C-15 (b)(1) (1996).
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exception to state investigatory powers, excluding investigations
based on conduct protected by the First Amendment.'
As such,
the law expressly protects financial support for the "nonviolent
political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of
any person or group."' To illustrate, if following an initial investigation into reported criminal conduct of Ms. X and her congregation, the facts reasonably indicated that all donations were intended to go toward the school building for Antixanian children
living overseas, law enforcement officials would have to cease their
investigatory efforts or risk violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Consequently, the new Illinois law establishes workable
guidelines for legitimate investigations while simultaneously protecting the ability of Illinois residents to express themselves freely
through financial transactions for nonviolent activities.
As
drafted, this law does not violate the Fourth Amendment and is
otherwise constitutionally valid.
C. Supremacy Clause Concerns
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Constitution
allows the federal government to preempt any state law only
where there is an actual conflict between a federal law and a state
law, or where Congress expressly or impliedly "occupies the field"
subject to regulation.1 Because the new Illinois antiterrorism law
does not conflict with federal legislation, this Section addresses the
issue of whether federal law should preempt for any other reasons.
While in rare cases Congress has identified its express occupation of a certain field, in its earlier decisions, the Supreme
Courts bore the responsibility for ascertaining congressional intent
and abrogating inconsistent state regulations.2 ' To that end, the
underlying policy was to prevent the impediments to congressional
purposes stemming from the federal and state agencies that acted
in discord.2"
In its modem decisions, however, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to interpret congressional objectives absent clear
indications of Congress' intentions."' Moreover, to avoid the role
of delineator of the state sovereignty boundaries, the Court will
208. 720 ILCS 5/29C-15 (b)(2) (1996).
209. Id.
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD E.
ROTUNDA, CONSrTUTIoNAL LAW § 9.1 (5th ed. 1995).
211. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 210, § 9.2.
212. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (establishing that federal law preempts a state regulation where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress.").
See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956) (elaborating on
the preemption analysis and instituting a three-part examination).
213. Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1299 (1995) (citing New York
State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)).
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maintain the validity of state regulation, unless congressional intent favoring preemption is persuasively manifested.21 As such, a
state regulation that complements existing federal law could be
valid, especially if Congress left room for state regulation in fiscal
and criminal aspects of the federal law.21 Finally, the Court has
held that states are well within their powers to legislate by instituting higher levels of protection for its residents than those
granted by the federal government in similar matters.21
To illustrate, the enactment of the controversial AntiApartheid Act of 1986,217 which limited economic ties to the South

Africa regime did not act to preempt state decisions to further
sever ties with the South-African economy in the absence of clear
indication of such preemptive intent.218 One of the leading preemption opinions is the Illinois Supreme Court's Springfield Rare
Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson.1 9 In Springfield Rare Coin, the
court established a three-prong test to determine whether a federal law should preempt a state regulation.o First, the court held
that although the authority to conduct foreign affairs is ordinarily
within the federal government's domain, it is within states' powers
to impact foreign relations if such effects are incidental and evenhanded."' Second, the court pointed out that state legislators may
not direct their legislative authority at a single nation. 2 Finally,
where a state's legislature is motivated solely by disapproval of a
foreign nation's policies, any legislative product is an unconstitutional exercise of the lawmaking authority."a
The application of the Springfield Rare Coin test to the new
Illinois antiterrorism law confirms the law's constitutionality. By
penalizing solicitation and contribution of material support intended to facilitate terrorists' violent attacks on human lives, the
State of Illinois is regulating its residents' criminal conduct, traditionally the domain of local legislatures. Although the imposition
of criminal liability for such solicitations and contributions
"generally can be said to have some effect on foreign na214. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW § 6-25, at n.12
(2d ed. 1988).
215. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (holding that states may not supplement federal law only if Congress "left no room" for such complementing
additions).
216. See California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279
(1987) (explaining that a federal law is "a floor beneath which... benefits
may not drop- not ceiling above which they may not rise.").
217. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
218. TRIBE, supra note 214, § 6-25 at n.12.
219. 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986).
220. Id. at 305-07.
221. Id. at 306.
222. Id. at 307.
223. Id.
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tions... ,"2 the burdens of these effects are clearly incidental.
Additionally, while Hamas' fundraising activities in Chicago
prompted action on the part of the Illinois legislature, the new antiterrorism law does not direct its sword towards a distinct nation.
To the contrary, the law specifically limits its application to the
terrorist activities of "private person[s] or non-governmental entit[ies]." 225 As such, the Illinois law calls for evenhanded application, without targeting another sovereign's regime.
Finally, due to the continuous escalation of terrorist violence,
the United States has acted to protect its citizens at home and
In February
abroad by enacting several antiterrorism laws.2
Empire
State
attack
at
the
recent
terrorist
to
the
1997, in response
Building, President Clinton called for more stringent federal and
state gun laws. 227 Illinois has acted in the spirit of state and federal uniformity, by instituting penalties for offenders who finance
violence. Therefore, the new Illinois law satisfies the Springfield
Rare Coin test for purposes of Supremacy Clause and should be
upheld as constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Governmental infringement upon the people's constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms would have a debilitating consequence on the
democratic order in this country. It follows that appropriate safeguards are necessary to ensure that every new law, whether state
or federal, is constitutionally valid.
Illinois' antiterrorism law contains appropriate safeguards
and would withstand any constitutional challenge. Because the
law includes definitions of legal terms of art, in effect it permits
only the most narrow application, punishing support of brutal terrorist attacks on innocent civilians overseas. Moreover, the Illinois
law criminalizes only support of violent acts that unquestionably
would be felonious according to the existing laws of Illinois. Most
importantly, public policy requires state intervention where its
residents are involved in support of deadly attacks conducted
abroad. Finally, because the new Illinois law complements the
existing federal legislation and is incidental to the field of foreign
relations, it should be upheld as constitutional for purposes of the
Supremacy Clause.

224. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(11. 1986).
225. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (1996).
226. See supra notes 41-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
antiterrorism laws.
227. What's News, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1997, at Al.

